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AIDS AND THE INCONTESTABILITY CLAUSE
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this Note is to re-examine an old concept of
insurance law, the incontestability clause, in light of a number of
changes which have occurred in state statutory law and in society.1
This Note will trace the history of the incontestability clause, the
conditions in which it has been given effect, and attempts to mod-
ify its effect. The Note will also analyze some of the ramifications
of the presence of an incontestability clause in a policy of life insur-
ance. This Note will consider various states' statutes as these apply
to the incontestability clause and analyze how courts have inter-
preted incontestability clauses in various jurisdictions. The Note
will also reconsider the incontestability clause in light of the
advent of AIDS, and recommend how the incontestability clause
should be construed in the future.
Incontestability clauses have been used by the insurance
industry for over one hundred years to encourage persons to
purchase life insurance.' Today, the incontestability clause is
required in insurance policies to give a measure of assurance to
purchasers that, upon death after many years of premium pay-
ments, benefits will be paid to beneficiaries notwithstanding any
defect, misstatement, misrepresentation, or even fraud in the
application for insurance.3 The incontestability clause effectively
prevents an insurer from using the answers of an insured in an
application for insurance to void a policy many years after the pol-
icy was issued.' The incontestability clause may become increas-
1. Nearly all life insurance policies contain a provision that the policy may not be
contested after it has been in effect for two years from the date of its issue except for the
nonpayment of premiums or violation of certain policy provisions precluding coverage such
as death during active military service. Such incontestability clause policy provisions are
generally required by statute. See infra note 27. For a general discussion of the
incontestability clause, see Young, "Incontestable" - As To What?, 1964 ILL. L. F. 323;
NoTE, The Incontestable Clause In Combination Life Insurance Policies, 31 ILL. L. REV.
769 (1937); Cooper, Incontestable Life Insurance, 19 ILL. L. REV. 226 (1924).
2. See Plotner v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 48 N.D. 295, 183 N.W. 1000, 1003
(1921). The Plotner court, addressing incontestability clauses in insurance policies, noted
that insurance agents undoubtedly point out the clause to prospective purchasers and
explain that policy coverage may not be denied and that no defense may be asserted by the
insurer after the passage of the period of contestability. Id. at 304, 183 N.W. at 1003.
3. Maxwell v. Cumberland Life Ins. Co., 113 Idaho 808, 811, 748 P.2d 392, 395-397
(1987). The Maxwell court stated that the purpose of the incontestability clause is to
require insurers to carefully scrutinize applications and act quickly to void a contract of
insurance. Id. Such a duty to immediately investigate suspicious matters prevents insurers
from "lulling the insured into a sense of security, only to litigate the issue later." Id.
4. Sellwood v. Equitable Life Ins. Co. of Iowa, 230 Minn. 529, 534, 42 N.W.2d 346, 351
(1950). Because of the incontestability clause, the insurer is limited to two years during
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
ingly important in coming years as courts,5 legislatures,' and the
insurance industry7 struggle with the new issues raised by the
advent of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, the long
latency period of that disease," and its fatal outcome.9
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE
INCONTESTABILITY CLAUSE
A. HISTORY OF THE INCONTESTABILITY CLAUSE
1. Early History and Purpose of the Incontestability Clause
Insurance companies initially offered the incontestability
clause as a policy provision because of public distrust of insurers
and their promises to pay benefits in the future.' ° The first incon-
testability clause was offered in 1848 by London Indisputable Life,
a British insurance underwriter, whose company charter provided
that it would not contest a policy for any reason." The incontest-
ability clause was first used in the United States as a policy provi-
sion by the Manhattan Life Insurance Company in 1864.12 The
first legislation having the effect of rendering a policy incontesta-
ble was passed less than ten years later. In 1873 the Ohio legisla-
ture passed legislation which provided that, after an insurer had
received three premium payments, the insurer was estopped from
asserting any defenses other than fraud or misstatements of age
against claims on life insurance policies. 13 The first modem stat-
which it may void the policy for fraudulent answers made in the procurement of the
coverage. Id.
5. For a discussion of how recent courts have dealt with the interpretation of the
incontestability clause, see infra notes 80-122 and accompanying text.
6. For a discussion of how legislatures have dealt with the incontestability clause, see
infra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
7. For a discussion of how the insurance industry has dealt with the interpretation of
the incontestability clause, see infra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
8. For a discussion of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome and the life insurance
issues relating to the disease, see infra notes 123-142 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 136.
10. J. GREIDER & W. BEADLES, LAW AND THE LIFE INSURANCE CONTRACT 237 (1968)
[hereinafter J. GREIDER]. Common abuses by life insurance companies included the refusal
to pay death benefits or offers of settlement of substantially less than the policy value
because of often minor misrepresentations in the application. H. GRANT, INSURANCE
REFORM: CONSUMER ACTION IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 22-27 (1979) [hereinafter H.
GRANT].
11. J. GREIDER, supra note 10, at 237.
12. THE LIFE INSURANCE POLICY CONTRACT 57 (H. Krueger & L. Waggoner 1953).
13. 1872 OHIO LAWS, at 160 (codified as OHIO REVISED STATUTES OF 1880, § 5779
(LANING 1907)). The first incontestability statute was somewhat different than the typical
modem version of the incontestability statute in that it barred the raising of all defenses
except fraud and misstatements of age and did not permit insurers to preserve other
defenses in the policy. Id. The text of the original statute provided:
When companies estopped from certain defenses.
All companies, after having received three annual premiums on any policy
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utes requiring incontestability clauses in life insurance contracts
did not appear until mounting public pressure forced state legisla-
tures to enact laws to remedy the dishonesty then rampant in the
life insurance industry.
14
In 1906, the Armstrong Commission' 5 investigated the insur-
ance industry in New York in response to numerous charges of
corruption, fraud, and dishonesty. 16 Through a series of sixty pub-
lic hearings, the Armstrong Commission carefully probed into
every aspect of the insurance industry.' The Armstrong Commis-
sion uncovered many scandals within the insurance industry'8 and
unleashed a reform movement that quickly led to extensive regu-
lation of what had largely been an unrestrained industry.' 9
The Armstrong Commission was quickly followed by other
reformer-minded groups. The most important of these reform
groups was a national conference of governors, attorneys general,
and insurance commissioners held in Chicago in 1906.20 The con-
ference formed a Committee on Uniform Legislation, known as
issued on the life of any person in this state, are estopped from defending, upon
any other ground than fraud, against any claim arising upon such policy by
reason of any errors, omissions, or misstatements of the assured, in any
application made by such assured, on which the policy was issued, except as to
age.
Id.
14. See, H. GRANT, supra note 10, at 28-38. The first modem statute requiring an
incontestability clause in insurance contracts was passed after 1905 by New York. J.
GREIDER, supra note 10, at 237. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
15. The Armstrong Commission was named for the chairman of the eight member
committee, state Senator William W. Armstrong of Rochester, New York. H. GRANT, supra
note 10, at 37.
16. H. GRANT, supra note 10, at 28-38. Several New York journals and newspapers
chronicled the abuses of the insurance industry in a series of exposes and bitter editorials.
Id. Various financial improprieties led to much of the public outcry but the chief evil
leading to the adoption of a mandatory incontestability clause was the common practice of
threatening beneficiaries with expensive litigation if they failed to accept a proffered
settlement offer. Id. at 30-31.
17. H. GRANT, supra note 10, at 47. The chief counsel for the Armstrong Commission
was the then little known Charles Evans Hughes. The notoriety of the Commission's
scandalous findings lifted Hughes to the New York governorship. He later served as Chief
Justice of the United States Supreme Court. See generally 1 M. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS
HUGHES (1951) [Hereinafter M. PUSEY].
18. H. GRANT, supra note 10, at 38-43. Many, but not all the scandalous details about
the insurance industry were financial in nature. Id. at 41. For example, The Armstrong
Commission uncovered a "House of Mirth," a rooming house operated jointly by several of
the largest insurance companies to entertain public servants. Id. The "House of Mirth" was
used by the insurance industry to help prevent the passage of unfriendly bills. Id.
19. Id. at 43-54. The report of the Armstrong Commission prompted Wisconsin, and
other states, to investigate their insurance companies. Id. Further, the report of the
Armstrong Commission prompted many other state legislatures to pass regulations to bring
the industry under control. Id.
20. S. CLOUGH, A CENTURY OF AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE 224-225 (1946). Many
states adopted a large portion of the statutes drafted for the Armstrong Commission by
Charles Evans Hughes. M. PUSEY, supra note 17, at 166-67.
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the Committee of Fifteen.2 ' The Committee of Fifteen drafted
model insurance policies which included the reform measures rec-
ommended by The Armstrong Commission.22 The Committee of
Fifteen included the incontestability clause in the model life insur-
ance policies it proposed.2 3 Following the Armstrong Investiga-
tion, the state of New York enacted the Standard Policy Law
which required an incontestability clause in all life insurance poli-
cies sold in New York.24 In 1907, North Dakota adopted New
York's Standard Policy of life insurance as its own.
25
In 1946, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(hereinafter N.A.I.C.) drafted a model incontestability clause stat-
ute based on the 1907 New York Standard Policy language.26 At
least 47 states have adopted statutes requiring the inclusion of an
incontestability clause in every policy of life insurance sold in that
state.2 7 Most of these states, in enacting incontestability legisla-
21. S. CLOUGH, supra.
22. Id.
23. J. GRIEDER, supra note 10, at 237. See also Jordon v. Western States Life Ins. Co.,
78 N.D. 902,53 N.W.2d 860 (1952) wherein the North Dakota Supreme Court in construing
North Dakota's incontestability statute stated:
All of the statutes before us in this case hark back to the report of the
Armstrong Committee and the "Committee of Fifteen" which pointed out the
evils then existing in the insurance business and recommended legislation to
correct such evils. North Dakota, early in 1907, was the first state to enact the
recommended legislation into law.
Id. at 905, 53 N.W.2d at 863.
24. J. GREIDER, supra note 10, at 237. See also 1906 LAWS OF NEW YORK ch. 326.
Much of the New York legislation was written by Charles Evans Hughes, the chief counsel
to the Armstrong Commission. M. JAMES, THE METROPOLITAN LIFE: A STUDY IN BUSINESS
GROWTH 166 (1947). See also M. PUSEY, supra note 17, at 166.
25. 1907 LAWS OF N.D. Chap. 140, § 2.
26. W. VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE 591 (3rd ed. 1951).
27. ALA.- CODE § 27-18-4 (1986); ALASKA STAT. § 21-48-120 (1988); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 20-1260 (1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 23-83-111(a) (1987); CAL. INS. CODE § 10206
(West 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-7-202 (1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18 § 3114 (1989);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 35-515(2) (1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.560 (West 1984); GA. CODE
ANN. § 56-2704 (aX2) (Harrison 1987); HAW. REV. STAT. § 431-584 (1985); IDAHO CODE
§ 41-2012 (1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, 843(a) (Smith-Hurd 1965); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-
1-12-41(bX2) (Burns 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 509.2 (West 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-
420(2) (1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.16-130 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1988); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 22:176(2) (West 1959); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24A, § 2615(1); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 48A, § 428 (1986); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 134(1) (West 1987); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.4432 (West 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 61A.03 sub. 1(c) (1986); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 377.320 (Vernon 1968); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-20-1203 (1987); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 44-1607(2) (1988); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 688B.060 (Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 408:16(11) (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:27-12 (West 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-
21-13 (1986); N.Y. INS. LAW § 3220(aXl) (McKinney 1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-58-140(2)
(1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-33-11(2) (1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3917.06(B)
(Anderson 1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 4103(2) (West 1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 743.315
(1989); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 532.6(2) (Purdon 1971); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-65-210(2)
(Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 58-16-35 (1978); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 56-7-601(3XB) (1989); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 3.50 sec. 2(2) (Vernon 1981);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-510 (1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3814 (1984); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 38.2-3326 (1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.24.120 (1984); W. VA. CODE § 33-14-10
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tion, have adopted the model incontestability clause statute of the
N.A.I.C. 28 Thus, the form of the incontestability clause required
by various state statutes is quite consistent.
The purpose most commonly stated for the existence of the
incontestability clause is the protection of beneficiaries from
unnecessary litigation after the death of an insured.29 Because a
life insurance policy is regarded as a form of contract which must
be honestly entered into and carefully complied with by the
insured to avoid rescission by the insurer, absent an incontestabil-
ity clause, a beneficiary might be faced with the uncertainty of no
death benefit following years of premium payments.3 ° Chief Jus-
tice Oliver Wendel Holmes, addressing the purpose of the incon-
testability clause stated: "The object of the clause is plain and
laudable-to create an absolute assurance of the benefit, as free as
may be from any dispute of the fact except the fact of death, and
as soon as it reasonably can be done."'3 1
(1988); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 632.46(2) (West 1980); WyO. STAT. § 26-17-112 (1989). The
author's research indicates that only Connecticut, Mississippi and Rhode Island do not
statutorily require incontestability clauses in life insurance policies.
28. See supra note 27. The incontestability statutes are often located in a section of a
state's insurance code listing certain required provisions for all group life insurance policies.
See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-33-05 (1989). Section 26.1-33-05 of the North Dakota
Century Code provides:
Provisions required in life policy. No life insurance policy may be issued or
delivered in this state, unless the policy contains:...
3. A provision that the policy constitutes the entire contract between the
parties and is incontestable after it has been in force during the lifetime of the
insured for two years from its date, except for nonpayment of premiums and
except for violations of the policy relating to naval or military service in time of
war, and, at the option of the company, provisions relative to benefits in the
event of total and permanent disability and provisions that grant additional
insurance specifically against death by accident also may be excepted.
Id.
29. See, e.g., Simpson v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 24 N.Y.2d 262, 266, 247 N.E.2d
655, 657, 299 N.Y.S. 2d 835, 839 (1969).
30. See, e.g., Powell v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 313 Ill. 161, 164-165, 144 N.E.
825, 827 (1924). The Powell court recounted the historical plight of life insurance
beneficiaries:
In the earlier development of insurance contracts it not infrequently
occurred that, after the insured had paid premiums for a large number of years,
the beneficiaries under the policy found, after the maturity thereof by the death
of the insured, that they were facing a lawsuit in order to recover the insurance;
that in certain answers in the application it was said by the insurer the insured
had made statements which were not true, and the beneficiaries were not
entitled to recover on the policy. It is needless to call attention to the fact that
this situation gave rise to a widespread suspicion in the minds of the public that
an insurance contract was designed largely for the benefit of the company.
Recognizing this fact, and seeing the effect of it on the insurance business,
numerous insurance companies inserted in their policies what is now known as
an incontestable clause.
Id.
31. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v, Johnson, 254 U.S. 96, 101-102 (1920).
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2. The Development of the Holland Committee and the
Standard Policy
The function of the incontestability clause was somewhat
unsettled through the early years of this century. Some courts
held that the incontestability clause only acted as a waiver of an
insurer's right to challenge the terms of the policy. 32 Other courts
held that the clause barred all of an insurer's defenses to a life
insurance claim.33 Still other courts held that the incontestability
clause acted as a statute of limitation or repose.34 The only gener-
ally accepted certainty was that the incontestability clause was
clearly meant to remove fraud as a defense after the passage of
two years.35 Courts have almost uniformly held that while the
incontestability clause recognizes fraud as a defense, the insurer is
limited by the two-year provision as to when the fraud may be
32. See, e.g., Scarborough v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 171 N.C. 353, 88 S.E. 482 (1916).
The Scarborough court stated that by the inclusion of an incontestability clause in the
insurance contract the parties to the contract must mean that the provisions of the policy
will not be contested and not that the insurance company contracts to waive the right to
defend itself against a risk which it never intended to assume. Id. at 355, 88 S.E. at 483.
33. Many courts treated the effect of the incontestability clause as a total bar which
precluded the raising of any defense by an insurer. See, e.g., Plotner v. Northwestern Nat'l
Life Ins. Co., 48 N.D. 295, 183 N.W. 1000 (1921). The Plotner court held that an insurer, by
the terms of the insurance contract, was precluded from voiding the policy on any grounds
except for the failure to pay the policy premiums. Id. at 303, 183 N.W. at 1003. See also
Jordon v. Western States Life Ins. Co., 78 N.D. 902,53 N.W.2d 860 (1952). In discussing the
effect of the North Dakota incontestability statute, theJordon court stated that "in this state
the legislative intent that the incontestability clause should bar all defenses, not expressly
and allowably excepted from its operation, is distinctly expressed." Id. at 912, 53 N.W.2d at
865.
34. See, e.g., Wright v. Mutual Ben. Life Ass'n of America, 121 N.Y. 147, 23 N.E. 186
(1890). In Wright, the court noted that the incontestability clause does not exonerate fraud,
but rather provides sufficient time during which fraud may be discovered, but beyond
which time period such fraud may not be employed to invalidate a policy. Id. The Wright
court stated that the incontestability clause resembles and functions much like statutes of
limitations. Id. at 148, 23 N.E. at 187.
35. Massachusetts Benefit Life Ass'n v. Robinson, 104 Ga. 270, 30 S.E. 918 (1898). The
Robinson court stated that the incontestability clause drew a bright line and removed all
allegations of fraud as a defense to a policy. Id. at 277, 30 S.E. at 925. The Robinson court
noted that if the incontestability clause did not have such a clear cut effect the result would
be to create degrees of fraud. Id. at 927-928. But see Rasmussen v. Equitable Life
Assurance Soc. of United States, 293 Mich. 482, 292 N.W.2d 377 (Mich. 1940). The
Rasmussen court refused to allow an insured's fraudulent answers in an application expand
the coverage of a group life insurance policy to cover a person older than that permitted
under the terms of the policy. Id. at 486, 292 N.W. at 379. The court stated that,
notwithstanding the usual preclusion by the incontestability clause of the assertion of fraud
as a defense, an insured could not thereby bring himself within policy coverage. Id. The
Rasmnussen court stated that if the truth of an insured's age remains undiscovered during
the period of contestability, such non-discovery would not create coverage for a risk
expressly excluded by the terms of the policy. Id. Thus, the understatement of age, where
the coverage of a group policy is expressly limited to a specific age group, would not come
within the reach of the incontestability clause, any more than a misstatement that one is an
employee when in truth an applicant does not belong to the group of employees to be
covered. Id.
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asserted as a defense to payment of the policy benefit.36 There is
usually little doubt that after a policy becomes incontestable by
the expiration of the two year period, the answers of the insured in
the original application cannot be used by the insurer to avoid the
policy. 37 However, there have been persistent questions concern-
ing whether the clause precludes the raising of other defenses by
the insurer,38 or whether the clause acts to expand the coverage of
the policy.
39
Most of the variation in the interpretation of the incontestabil-
ity clause changed in 1930 when the scope of the incontestability
clause was addressed by the New York Court of Appeals in Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co. v. Conway.4" In Conway, Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company applied to the New York superintendent of
insurance for approval of a rider for its policies. 4' The effect of the
rider was to except, as a risk not assumed, the death of insureds
resulting from "service, travel or flight in any species of air craft,
except as a fare-paying passenger."42 The superintendent of insur-
ance held that the proposed rider was inconsistent with the state's
incontestability statute which required that the only exceptions to
the clause were non-payment of premiums and violation of the
conditions of the policy relating to military or naval service in time
36. Wright v. Mutual Benefit Life Ass'n of America, 121 N.Y. 147, 148, 23 N.E. 186, 187
(1890). In Wright the court noted that the two year limitation provides sufficient time and
opportunity for the insurer to establish a defense of fraud. Id. at 148, 23 N.E. at 187.
37. Sellwood v. Equitable Life Ins. Co. of Iowa, 230 Minn. 529, 42 N.W.2d 346, 351
(1950). The Sellwood court noted that there are two effects of the incontestability clause.
Id. at 536,42 N.W. at 351. The first is, in the absence of fraud, to recast all statements made
by the applicant as representations and not as warranties. Id. Secondly, the incontestability
clause limits the time during which the insurer may contest the policy on the basis of
fraudulent answers in the application. Id.
38. See, e.g., Wright v. Mutual Benefit Life Ass'n of America, 121 N.Y. 147, 23 N.E. 186-
187 (1890). Since at least 1890 courts have been asked to hold that the incontestability
clause acts to waive or preclude all defenses of an insurer. Id. at 148, 23 N.E. at 187. Since
at least that time insurers have complained that the most expansive reading of the
incontestability clause served to condone fraud and to remove all of an insurer's defenses.
Id. To this assertion, the Wright court answered that the incontestability clause is:
[N]ot a stipulation absolute to waive all defenses, and to "condone fraud."
On the contrary, it recognizes fraud and all other defenses, but it provides ample
time and opportunity within which they may be, but beyond which they may
not be, established. It is in the nature of, and serves a similar purpose, as statutes
of limitations and repose, the wisdom of which is apparent to all reasonable
minds. Id.
39. See, e.g., Sanders v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 10 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1925).
The Sanders court stated that an incontestability clause does not transform a promise to pay
in the event of a stated contingency into a promise to pay regardless of whether the
contingency occurs. Id. at 144.
40. 252 N.Y. 449, 169 N.E. 642 (1930).
41. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Conway, 252 N.Y. 449, 169 N.E. 642 (1930).
42. Id.
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of war.43 Metropolitan Life appealed the superintendent's rul-
ing.44 The Appellate Division found the conflict between the rider
and the incontestability statute to be unreal and reversed the
Comissioner.4 5 The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the
Appellate Division, holding that the proposed rider and statute
were "consistent and harmonious. '46 Chief Judge Cardozo, writ-
ing for the court of appeals, held that the incontestability statute
only prohibited contests of the validity of the policy on any
grounds except for violations of specified policy conditions. 47 The
court, Cardozo said, "must distinguish between a denial of cover-
age and a defense of invalidity. '48 When an insurer has elected to
restrict coverage under a policy, 49 the policy may still be valid in
respect to the risks that are assumed.50 The incontestability clause
could neither create new coverage where there was none before
nor expand coverage to include risks that the insurer was unwill-
ing to assume. 5' The Conway court construed the incontestability
clause to mean only that after two years from the inception of the
policy the policy would be unassailable on the basis of fraud. 2 The
Conway court explicitly rejected the idea that the incontestability
clause might act as a mandate of absolute coverage for all risks not
explicitly excluded in the state's incontestability statute.53
43. Id. Such exclusions from the scope of the incontestability clause are universal in
essentially all state insurance codes. For a listing of these statutes, see supra note 27.
44. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Conway, 252 N.Y. 449, 169 N.E. 642 (1930).
45. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Beha, 226 A.D. 408, 235 N.Y.S. 501 (1929).
46. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Conway, 252 N.Y. 449, 169 N.E. 642 (1930).
47. Id. at 643 (emphasis added).
48. Id. The distinction between a denial of coverage and a defense of invalidity was
essential to the Conway court's holding. Id. A denial of coverage is merely a risk not
assumed by the insurer such as air travel or perhaps death by AIDS. See id. A defense of
invalidity, which may be properly barred by the incontestability clause after the passage of
two years, reflects dny fraud or misstatements made by the insured in the procurement of
the policy. See id.
49. Insurers typically choose not to assume particular risks as a method of regulating
costs. See generally Wortham, The Economics of Insurance Classification: The Sound Of
One Hand Clapping, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 835 (1986).
50. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Conway, 252 N.Y. at 450, 169 N.E. at 643. Any
challenge that an insurer might make to an insurance policy with an aviation risk exclusion
would do so not on the basis of invalidity, i.e. fraud in the application, but on the basis of a
lack of coverage. Id.
51. id.
52. Id. at 449, 169 N.E. at 642.
53. Id. at 449, 169 N.E. at 642. The Conway court's opinion, in an oft quoted
paragraph, stated:
The provision that a policy shall be incontestable after it has been in force
during the lifetime of the insured for a period of two years is not a mandate as to
coverage, a definition of the hazards to be borne by the insurer. It means only
this, that within the limits of the coverage the policy shall stand, unaffected by
any defense that it was invalid in its inception, or thereafter became invalid by
reason of a condition broken.
274
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Most, if not all the cases decided after 1930 have cited Con-
way as the touchstone for the interpretation of the incontestability
clause.54 Many courts have followed the reasoning set forth in
Conway and interpret the coverage of the incontestability clause
in terms of factors which would make a life insurance policy inva-
lid at the inception of the policy, rather than as a condition prece-
dent to coverage. 5 Courts following Conway generally hold that
the incontestability clause only pertains to conditions that would
have made the policy void from its inception.56 These courts do
not construe the clause to apply to conditions precedent to cover-
age, to eligibility requirements, or to limitations or exclusions from
coverage.57
After the Conway decision, only a few courts construed the
incontestability clause to bar the raising of all defenses not explic-
itly listed in the clause.58 The few courts that have held that an
incontestability clause bars all defenses have generally done so in
applying the clause in the context of group insurance policies, par-
ticularly where death benefits were claimed on the life of an ineli-
gible employee assertedly covered under the policy.
59
54. See, e.g., Freed v. Bankers Life Ins. Co. of Nebraska, 216 N.W.2d 357 (Iowa 1974).
The Freed court noted that Conway is cited by nearly all the text and case authorities
construing the incontestability clause. Id. at 359. See also Bonitz v. Travelers Ins. Co., 374
Mass. 327, 372 N.E.2d 254 (1978). "Discussion [of the incontestability clause] commonly
begins with the opinion of Chief Judge Cardozo in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Conway."
Id. at 329, 372 N.E.2d at 256.
55. Rasmussen v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 293 Mich. 482, 292 N.W.2d 377 (1940). A
condition precedent to coverage defines the hazards to be borne by the insurer. Id. at 484,
292 N.W.2d at 379. Such conditions usually are in the form of eligibility requirements with
criteria based on age, employment or good health. See generally id.
56. See Darden v. North American Benefit Ass'n, 170 Va. 479, 197 S.E. 413, 416
(1938Xcourt followed Conway and held that the incontestability clause applied only to
contests of the validity of the policy).
57. See Crawford v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of U.S., 56 IUI. 2d 41, 305 N.E.2d 144
(1973). The Crawford court stated that it considered the question of eligibility as one which
relates to the risk assumed, not the validity of the policy. Id. at 47, 305 N.E.2d at 150. Thus,
a defense based on a lack of eligibility is not barred by the incontestability clause. Id.
58. National Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Blankenbiller, 89 Ariz. 253, 360 P. 2d 1030
(1961); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Dorman, 108 F.2d 220 (9th cir. 1940) (applying
California law); Suskind v. American Republic Ins. Co., 458 F. Supp. 680 (D. Del. 1979),
rev'd on other grounds, 607 F.2d 76 (3rd Cir. 1979); Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Florence,
47 Ga. App. 711, 171 S.E. 317 (1933); Freed v. Bankers Life Ins. Co. of Nebraska, 216
N.W.2d 357 (Iowa 1974); Jackson v. Continental Cas. Co., 412 So.2d 1364 (La. 1982); Bonitz
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 374 Mass. 327, 372 N.E.2d 254 (1978); Strawbridge v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 504 F. Supp. 824 (D. N.J. 1980); Simpson v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 24 N.Y.2d
262, 247 N.E.2d 655 (1969); Chavis v. Southern Life Ins. Co., 318 N.C. 259, 347 S.E.2d 425
(1986); Jordon v. Western States Life Ins. Co., 78 N.D. 902, 53 N.W.2d 860 (1952); Baum v.
Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 357 P.2d 960 (Okla. 1960); Cragun v. Bankers Life Co.,
28 Utah 2d 19, 497 P.2d 641 (1972); Millis v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 162 Wash. 555, 298
P; 739 (1931); Poffenbarger v. New York Life Ins. Co., 277 F. Supp. 726 (S.D. W.V. 1967).
59. See, e.g., John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Dorman, 108 F.2d 220 (9th cir. 1940).
In Dorman, the deceased was an unpaid director of a company who was named as an
insured under the company's group life insurance policy. Id. at 223. The decedent's
named beneficiaries claimed coverage for the decedent's life notwithstanding the eligibility
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Perhaps in response to the cases failing to follow Conway, the
insurance industry drafted a model statute codifying the Cardozo
opinion in Conway.60 In 1947, the Life Insurance Association Of
America and the American Life Convention formed a committee
to draft model insurance statutes.61 The committee, known as the
Holland Committee, was formed by the insurance industry in
response to the growing number of decisions which interpreted
the incontestability clause broadly.6 2  The Holland Committee
proposed a model statue with the intention of limiting the broad
interpretation of incontestability clauses.63 The model statute pro-
posed by the Holland Committee read:
A clause in any policy of life insurance providing that
such policy shall be incontestable after a specified period
shall preclude only a contest of the validity of the policy,
and shall not preclude the assertion at any time of
defenses based upon provisions in the policy which
exclude or restrict coverage, whether or not such restric-
tions or exclusions are excepted in such clause.64
States began to adopt the model statue shortly after the Hol-
land Committee proposal was made.65 A total of 27 states cur-
rently have this or a similar, shorter6 statutory limitation to the
incontestability clause.67 The purpose of the model statute was to
requirement of the policy that all participants be employees of the company. Id. The
insurance company cited to Conway and asserted that the eligibility requirement
represented a hazard and that the incontestability clause does not prohibit contests based
on a lack of coverage by the policy. Id. The Dorman court distinguished Conway by saying
that Conway had "merely" held that the policy terms did not cover the "hazard of death of
a non-fare paying passenger in an aeroplane as a result of his traveling in it. " Id. (emphasis
in original). The Dorman court held that the word "coverage" did not apply to attributes or
qualities of the insured but only to the hazards to be assumed by the insurer. Id. Thus, the
Dorman court stated the incontestability clause precludes a showing after the two year
period has expired that the policy did not cover the insured because he lacks a certain
attribute or condition. Id. at 224.
60. J. GREIDER, supra note 10, at 243.




65. For the date of passage of each states' incontestability clause limitation, see infra
note 67.
66. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-33-11(2) (1989). The shorter limitation of the
incontestability clause is typically appended to the incontestability clause itself, rather than
standing alone as a separate section. The shorter form is typically quite similar to that used
in North Dakota and usually reads that "no such provision [of incontestability] may
preclude the assertion of [sic] any time of defenses based upon provisions in the policy
which relate to eligibility for coverage." N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-33-11(2) (1989).
67. See, ALA. CODE § 27-15-15 (1986) (enacted 1967); ALASKA STAT. § 21-45-160 (1988)
(enacted 1966); ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1217 (1975) (enacted 1954); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 23-83-11 l(b) (1987) (enacted 1959); CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.5 (West Supp. 1990) (enacted
1972); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 3114 (1975) (enacted 1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.463
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narrow the scope of the incontestability clause to only those con-
tests of a policy based on misrepresentations in the application that
would invalidate a policy.' Notwithstanding the success of the
model statute, courts in a few states which had not yet adopted the
model statute continued to hold that the clause did serve to bar all
defenses after the running of the period of contestability.69
B. MODERN INTERPRETATION OF THE INCONTESTABILITY
CLAUSE
1. Advent of the Group Life Insurance Policy
Group life insurance is generally distinguished from individ-
ual underwriting by several features unique to the group insur-
ance concept. Perhaps the most important difference between
group life insurance and individual life insurance for the purposes
of this Note is the general absence of individual medical examina-
tion or required proof of individual insurability.70 Insurers typi-
cally only require individual medical screening or proof of
insurability in three instances: first, in small groups where the risk
(West 1984) (enacted 1955); GA. CODE ANN. § 56-2509 (Harrison 1987) (enacted 1960);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 431-542 (1985) (enacted 1955); IDAHO CODE § 41-1916 (1977) (enacted
1961); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-1-12-41(bX2) (Burns 1986) (enacted 1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§304.15-170 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1988) (enacted 1970); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 22:170(BX5) (West 1959) (enacted in 1959); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24A, § 2615(2) (1964
& Supp. 1989) (enacted 1969); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 400 (1986) (enacted in 1956);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-20-118 (1987) (enacted 1947); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 688A.170
(Michie 1986) (enacted 1971); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:25-16 (West 1985) (enacted 1971); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 59A-20-16 (1986) (enacted in 1984); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-33-11(2) (1989)
(enacted in 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 4015 (West 1976) (enacted 1957); OR. REV.
STAT. § 743.168(2) (1989) (enacted 1967); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 58-15-11 (1978)
(enacted 1966); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-403(4) (1986) (enacted 1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
8, § 3733 (1984) (enacted 1969); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3110 (1986) (enacted 1952); W. VA.
CODE § 33-13-16 (1988) (enacted 1957); Wyo. STAT. § 26-16-115 (1989) (enacted 1967).
68. Miller v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 485 So.2d 746, 747 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986). The
Miller court held that Alabama's statute, which was based on the Holland Committee
statute, permitted the insurer to question the terms of the coverage of a policy,
notwithstanding the incontestability clause. Id. at 746-47.
69. See, e.g., National Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Blankenbiller, 89 Ariz. 253, 360 P.2d
1030 (1961). The Blankenbiller court asserted that "the majority rule" is that every
exception to the incontestability clause not explicitly stated in the statute itself is barred as a
defense to the policy at the end of the incontestability period. Id. at 255, 360 P.2d at 1032.
But see National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Mixon, 291 Ala. 467, 282 So.2d 308 (1973). The
Mixon court stated the stance that risks not assumed under the insurance policy are not
given coverage by the incontestability clause has "been adopted by a majority of other
courts which have considered the question." Id. at 473, 282 So.2d at 314. The
Blankenbiller court was undoubtedly mistaken as to the majority status of its holding in
light of the Conway case and the widespread adoption of the model statute which limits the
application of the incontestability clause. C.f id. (Mixon states the majority proposition).
70. D. GREGG, GROUP LIFE INSURANCE: AN ANALYSIS OF CONCEPTS, CONTRACTS,
COSTS, AND COMPANY PRACTICES 3-4 (3rd ed. 1962) [hereinafter D. GREGG]. Other
characteristics of group insurance include the coverage of many persons under one policy
although only the employer is actually a party to the contract; premium rates are subject to
experience rating and may rise or fall based on actual losses of a group; and generally no
individual selection of benefits is available. Id.
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to the insurer is greater because the size of the group is too small
to spread the risk; second, when individuals are late entrants to a
group after previously declining to apply for coverage; finally,
when large amounts of benefits are requested as a supplement to
basic coverage.7'
Coverage of individual lives under a single policy of group life
insurance is a relatively modem development in underwriting.
The first use of group life insurance is generally dated to 1912,
although earlier references to the concept do exist.72 The first pol-
icies were characterized by many of the features which today dis-
tinguish group life insurance from individual policies: a single
policy was issued which covered all persons listed in a "register";
coverage was on a yearly renewable term basis and was only effec-
tive during the period of employment; the employer paid the pre-
miums in advance; the policy terms included a grace period of 30
days; a misstatement of age provision; a right of conversion to indi-
vidual coverage after five years of continuous participation; and a
one year incontestability clause.73
Today, group life insurance is common. In 1987, more than
110 million persons were covered under some form of group life
insurance in the United States74 and group life accounted for more
than 40 percent of all life insurance in force 75 and more than 365
billion dollars of coverage.76 Death benefits from group life insur-
ance policies totalled more than nine billion dollars.77 The aver-
age group life insurance policy value in 1987 was $22,380.00.78 As
71. AIDS AND THE LAw 207 (W. Dornette ed. 1987). See also Clifford & Iuculano, Aids
and Insurance: The Rationale For Aids-Related Testing, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1806, 1809, n.
16 (1987) (citing HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, A COURSE IN GROUP
LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE pt. A, at 153 (1985)).
72. D. GREGG, supra note 70, at 6. The first policy of group life insurance was written
for Montgomery Wards in 1912 by The Equitable Life Assurance Society of The United
States. Id. The policy came after two years of effort by Ward to recruit an underwriter to
develop a plan to offer employer-paid life insurance for all of Ward's employees. Id. As
early as 1872, an insurance agent for Metropolitan Life suggested to his "home office a
blanket life insurance policy to cover all the workers in a plant without medical
examination." Id. at 5, n.3 (citing M. JAMES, THE METROPOLITAN LIFE: A STUDY IN
BUSINESS GROwTH 53 (1947)). The policy for Montgomery Ward was predated by a 1905
plan covering all employees of the United Cigar Stores chain through a series of individual
yearly renewable term policies, the premiums of which were collected and remitted by the
employer. Id. In 1911, a director of The Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United
States, intrigued by Ward's concept of group coverage, purchased a similar policy covering
employees of a plant he owned. Id.
73. Id. at 7.
74. AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE, 1988 FACT BOOK 32.
75. Id. at 19.
76. Id. at 30.
77. Id. at 43. Benefits were paid on the lives of more than 690,000 insureds. Id. at 44.
78. Id. at 21.
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is discussed more fully below,79 the spread of AIDS is likely to have
a tremendous impact on the life insurance industry as the death
toll from the disease is felt in greatly increased benefit payments
and higher premium charges for all.
2. The Incontestability Clause as a Bar to All Defenses Not
Raised in the Period of the Contestability Clause:
Simpson and Its Progeny
If Conway is the principle older case, then perhaps the lead-
ing modern case addressing the incontestability clause is Simpson
v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Company. 0 In 1969, a trend
toward a more liberal interpretation of the incontestability clause
began when the New York Court of Appeals decided Simpson v.
Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Company."' Simpson marked a
movement away from the strict construction of the incontestabil-
ity clause in Conway back toward the original interpretation of the
incontestability clause as a bar to all defenses to coverage under
the policy.
Simpson involved a group life insurance policy covering full
time employees.82 In a contest over coverage, the insurer asserted
a defense that the decedent was not an eligible employee."3 The
Simpson court reached a quite different holding from Conway and
its progeny. Both parties, in support of their respective positions,
offered the frequently quoted language from Conway which
stated that an incontestability clause was "not a mandate as to cov-
erage" but merely provided that "within the limits of the cover-
age, the policy shall stand, unaffected by any defense that it [the
policy] was invalid at its inception."'  The Simpson court stated
79. See infra notes 135 to 137.
80. 24 N.Y.2d 262, 247 N.E.2d 655, 299 N.Y.S. 2d 835 (1969). See Cragun v. Banker's
Life Company, 28 Utah 2d 19, 497 P.2d 641 (1972). The Cragun court acknowledged the
traditional "view that the incontestability clause of the policy precludes only those defenses
which would have been invalid at the inception of the policy." Id. at 21, 497 P.2d at 643.
The Cragun court also noted that such an interpretation is supported by a majority of the
older decisions, including Conway. Id. However, the Cragun court asserted, more recent
cases have not followed that view. Id. The court continued with a citation to Simpson and
then followed the holding of Simpson. Id.
81. Simpson v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 24 N.Y.2d 262, 247 N.E.2d 655,299 N.Y.S.
2d 835 (1969).
82. Id. at 264, 247 N.E.2d at 656, 299 N.Y.S. 2d at 837.
83. Id. at 265, 247 N.E.2d at 656, 299 N.Y.S. 2d at 838. Most of the recent cases
concerning the incontestability clause have involved contests regarding persons assertedly
covered under a group policy and a defense by the insurer that the decedent was not
eligible for coverage. See, e.g., Bonitz v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 374 Mass. 327, 372 N.E.2d 254
(1978). For a discussion of cases concerning the incontestability clause in the group
insurance context see Annotation 26 A.L.R. 3rd 632 (1969).
84. Simpson, 24 N.Y.2d at 266-267, 247 N.E.2d at 657, 299 N.Y.S. 2d at 839 (quoting
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Conway, 252 N.Y. 449, 452, 169 N.E. 642, 643 (1930)).
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that the passage was instructive but not dispositive noting that the
passage in Conway offered by both parties merely established a
frame of reference by which the court would have to make its
decision.85 The court framed the issue as whether "employment,"
as defined in the group life insurance policy being contested, was a
condition of insurance or a limitation of the risk which the insurer
contracted to underwrite. 8 If employment were a condition of
insurance the defense was barred by the policy's incontestability
clause.87 If employment were a limitation of the risk assumed, the
beneficiary could not recover under the policy.88 Thus, if employ-
ment is a condition to the policy coverage, rather than a limitation
of policy coverage, the insurer has to suffer the consequences of its
failure to investigate the insured and to contest the validity of the
policy during the two years of the incontestability period.89 The
Simpson court noted that limitations on the policy are those risks
"which could not be ascertained by the insurer by investigation at
the time the policy of insurance was issued."9
The Simpson court concluded that employment was a condi-
tion of insurance.9 1 The Simpson court's rationale for its holding
was that the feature which distinguishes between a condition and
a limitation is discoverability.92 The Simpson court asserted that
eligible employment is undoubtedly ascertainable when a group
policy is issued and thus the requirement of eligible employment
must be a condition.9 3 The court defined limitations to the cover-
age, which would properly be excluded from the incontestability
clause, as only those risks which could not be discovered at the
85. Simpson, 24 N.Y.2d at 267, 247 N.E.2d at 657, 299 N.Y.S. 2d at 839.
86. Id. at 266, 247 N.E.2d at 657, 299 N.Y.S. 2d at 838. The master policy at issue in
Simpson contained a provision that employees eligible for coverage under the policy were
all full-time employees regularly working a minimum of 30 hours a week at the employer's
usual place of business. Id. at 264, 247 N.E.2d at 656, 299 N.Y.S. 2d at 837.
87. Id. at 266, 247 N.E.2d at 657, 299 N.Y.S. 2d at 838.
88. Id. at 266, 247 N.E.2d at 657, 299 N.Y.S. 2d at 838.
89. Id. at 266, 247 N.E.2d at 657, 299 N.Y.S. 2d at 838. The Simpson court cited to,
among others, John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Dorman, 108 F.2d 220 (9th cir. 1939) in
support of this proposition. The Dorman court had held that the incontestability clause
precluded a defense that the insurance policy did not cover an insured because of a failure
of a condition. Id. at 224.
90. Simpson, 24 N.Y.2d at 267, 247 N.E.2d at 657-58, 657, 299 N.Y.S. 2d at 839. The
Simpson court cited to Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Conway, 252 N.Y. 449, 169 N.E. 642
(1930) as support of its interpretation of limitations on coverage. See also Cragun v.
Banker's Life Company, 28 Utah 2d 19, 497 P.2d 641 (1972). The Cragun court agreed with
the Simpson court's analysis of limitations as being those particular risks which could not be
discovered by the insurer at the time the policy was issued. Id. at 21, 497 P.2d at 643.
91. Simpson, 24 N.Y.2d at 266, 247 N.E.2d at 657, 299 N.Y.S. 2d at 838.
92. Id. at 267, 247 N.E.2d at 657, 299 N.Y.S. 2d at 840.
93. Id. at 267, 247 N.E.2d at 658, 299 N.Y.S. 2d at 840.
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time of the issuance of the policy.9" Thus, where the insurer can-
not, by investigation, guard against assuming a risk it does not wish
to insure, such as risks of death in noncommercial aviation or
death while on active military duty, the risk is properly classified
as a limitation with respect to the incontestability clause.95
Since 1969, other courts have followed the lead of Simpson,
holding that the incontestability clause precludes virtually any
defense by an insurer after the passage of two years.96 The reason-
ing for these decisions has been that the incontestability clause
safeguards an insured from excessive litigation after a policy has
been in force many years.97 The incontestability clause guarantees
the insured security in financial planning for named beneficiaries,
while providing an insurer a reasonable opportunity to
investigate.9
3. The Incontestability Clause as a Bar to Only Those
Defenses Which Fall Under That Which the Policy
Covers: Crawford and Its Progeny
Not all cases decided since 1969 have followed Simpson. The
leading case reaffirming the holding in Conway that the incontest-
ability clause bars only those defenses which fall under the cover-
age of the policy is Crawford v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of
US.99 The Crawford case has served as the counterpoint to Simp-
son in many of the cases decided after 1973.1°°
In Crawford, the insurance policy at issue was a group policy
which limited eligibility to full time employees scheduled for at
94. Id. at 267, 247 N.E.2d at 657, 299 N.Y.S. 2d at 839 (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
v. Conway, 252 N.Y. 449, 169 N.E. 642 (1930)).
95. Id. at 267, 247 N.E.2d at 658, 299 N.Y.S. 2d at 840.
96. See Bonitz v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 374 Mass. 327, 372 N.E.2d 254 (1978Xcourt held
that the incontestability clause barred an insurer from using the defense that insured was
never an employee); Cragun v. Bankers Life Co., 28 Utah 2d 19, 497 P.2d 641 (1972Xcourt
held that incontestability clause establishes a period during which an insurer may by
investigation guard against risks it doesn't intend to assume); Freed v. Bankers Life Ins. Co.
of Neb., 216 N.W.2d 357 (Iowa 1974Xcourt held that the incontestability clause requires an
insurer to use diligence in verifying an applicant's eligibility before insurance is issued).
97. See Bonitz v. Travelers Ins. Co., 374 Mass. 327, 372 N.E.2d 254 (1978).
98. Simpson, 24 N.Y.2d at 266, 247 N.E.2d at 657, 299 N.Y.S. 2d at 839.
99. 56 Ill. 2d 41, 305 N.E.2d 144 (1973).
100. See, e.g., Searcy v. Fidelity Bankers Life Ins. Co., 656 S.W.2d 39 (Tenn. App.
1983Xcourt rejected Simpson, followed Crawford, and held that the incontestability clause
did not preclude the raising of a defense of a lack of coverage); Jackson v. Continental Cas.
Co., 412 So.2d 1364 (La. 1982Xcourt cited to both Simpson and Crawford but relied on
existing Louisiana precedent which barred the raising of all defenses by the insurer); Home
Life Ins. Co. v. Reguiera, 313 So.2d 438 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975Xcourt stated that Simpson
was wrongly decided and adopted the reasoning of Crawford). For a critique of the
Simpson decision and a critical comparison of that case to Crawford, see Sfikas, The
Interface Between Coverage and The Incontestable Clause in Group Life Insurance, 1974
CHI. B. REC. 298.
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least thirty-two hours per week.' 0 ' The decedent, the wife of the
owner whose business held the policy, worked only a few hours
per month. 10 2 After her death and the submission of the benefits
claim, the insurer discovered her part-time status and denied pay-
ment of the benefit. 0 3 The Crawford court framed its discussion
of the case around whether the eligibility of an employee relates to
the "coverage" of the policy and may, therefore, be challenged
notwithstanding the inclusion of an incontestability clause in the
policy. 10 4 The Crawford court noted that the conventional incon-
testability clause contained certain common exceptions such as for
nonpayment of premiums. 10 5  However, the Crawford court
stated that there were other grounds not enumerated in the incon-
testability clause on which an insurer may deny a claim after the
period of contestability has run."° The Crawford court main-
tained that the incontestability clause obviously does not preclude
a denial based on the failure of a particular event insured against
not taking place. 107 Therefore, the insurer would not be barred
from "contesting" the claim or the claimant's interpretation of the
coverage provisions. 10 8
The Crawford court reasoned that the split in the jurisdictions
on the question of the effect of the incontestability clause was due
in part to the application of the clause to both individual life insur-
ance and to group life insurance.'0 9 In the case of individual life
insurance policies the difference between a challenge as to cover-
age and a challenge as to validity is, as the Conway court noted,
fairly easy to distinguish. 110 In a group life plan, however, where
coverage is based on individuals being included within a certain
class of persons, misrepresentations as to that status can create cov-
erage where the insurer was unwilling to otherwise assume a
risk. 111




104. Id. at 45, 305 N.E.2d at 147.
105. Id. at 47, 305 N.E.2d at 148.
106. Id.
107. Id. Thus, if the insurance policy provided coverage against the risk of death while
an insured was in the employ of the master policy holder, the insurer could properly defend
on the basis of the failure of the stated event to occur if the insured died after employment
ended. See id.
108. Id.
109. ld. at 48, 305 N.E.2d at 149.
110. Id.
111. Id. The Crawford court stated that in the case of individual life insurance, the
policy specifies a particular individual by name, and it is relatively easy to distinguish
between a question of coverage, the death of the insured or death from some specified
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The Crawford court held that the insurer's challenge to eligi-
bility, in the group insurance context, related to the risk assumed
and not to the coverage provided. 112 Thus, the Crawford court
stated, such a challenge was not an attack on the validity of the
policy and the incontestability clause would not be implicated
because the insurer sought not to void the policy, but to enforce
the strict terms of the policy.
113
The Crawford court criticized the holding in Simpson as
being a basic withdrawal from the rationale of Conway. 1 4 The
Conway opinion had distinguished between policy provisions con-
cerning the validity of the policy, to which the incontestability
clause undoubtedly applies, and those provisions relating to the
risk assumed, to which the incontestability clause does not
apply." 5 Additionally, the Crawford court noted other reasons for
its disapproval of the Simpson analysis. The Crawford court stated
that social policy warranted the exclusion of certain claims from
the effect of the incontestability clause, noting that the misstate-
ment of an insured's age was such a claim.116 If individuals not
eligible for life insurance coverage were to receive coverage by
action of the incontestability clause, the Crawford court reasoned,
insurance rates would increase for everyone. "' The Crawford
court noted a further reason to construe the incontestability clause
more narrowly is that a contrary interpretation might permit cov-
erage to be extended to persons whose inclusion in the eligible
group might end after the passing of the period of
contestability.118
cause, and a question of validity created by a material misrepresentation in the application
for insurance by the insured. Id. However, in the case of group life insurance, the master
policy provides insurance for an assemblage of unnamed persons defined only in terms of
membership in a class, such as the employees of a certain company. Id. To establish
whether a person is insured requires a determination of whether the insured is in fact a
member of the class. Id. Because this determination is based upon information furnished
by the employer or the employee, the question whether coverage exists tends to become
interwoven with the question of whether the coverage was obtained by false
representations. Id.
112. Id. at 50, 305 N.E.2d at 150.
113. Id. In Crawford, the court viewed the challenge by an insurer based on a defense
of a lack of coverage to be an attempt by the insurer to strictly enforce the terms of the
insurance policy. Id. The Crawford court's interpretation of the incontestability clause was
that the clause only applied to challenges to a policy in which the insurer sought to void the
policy and not to actively enforce the terms of the policy. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Crawford, 56 Ill.2d at 52, 305 N.E.2d at 150-51 (the Crawford court relied on
Rasmussen v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 293 Mich. 482, 292 N.W. 377 (1940), which held
that a greater social good was achieved by permitting insurers to restrict admission into
group insurance plans).
117. Crawford, 56 Ill.2d at 52, 305 N.E.2d at 151.
118. Id. A holding contrary to that taken by the Crawford court might result in
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Finally, the Crawford court took issue with the rationale of
the Simpson decision. 119 In Simpson, the incontestability clause
effectively estopped an insurer from asserting a defense because of
the discoverability of a "condition of insurance" which was
asserted by the insurer as a "limitation on insurance. '1 20  The
Crawford court stated that this doctrine "would put the insurer to
an election between the risk of making payment on unwarranted
claims or conducting an investigation... of every person purport-
edly insured.' 1 21 Such a situation would cause increased expense
and the duplication of records for group insurance programs that
are designed to be conducted in a "self-administrative" fashion.
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III. AIDS AND THE INCONTESTABILITY CLAUSE
A. THE PROBLEM WITH AIDS AND LIFE INSURANCE
GENERALLY
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (hereinafter
AIDS)' 2 3 first came to public attention in May, 1981.124 AIDS is
caused by a virus known as Human Immunodeficiency Virus (here-
inafter HIV).1 25 AIDS may be diagnosed either with or without
persons retaining coverage under a group insurance plan long after leaving the group as the
insurer would be barred from raising a defense of a lack of coverage. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. See Simpson v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 24 N.Y.2d 262, 266, 247 N.E.2d
655, 657, 299 N.Y.S. 2d 835, 838 (1969Xrisks which are considered limitations are those
which cannot be ascertained through investigation by the insurer at the time the policy is
issued).
121. Crawford v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of U.S., 56 I11. 2d 41, 53, 305 N.E.2d
144, 151 (1973).
122. Id. Most group plans are administered by the employer of the members of the
group. The employer typically ascertains eligibility, collects and remits premiums, and
maintains the membership data which is transmitted to the insurer, often on the
anniversary date of the policy. The insurer typically only becomes involved in the
administration of the plan when a claim is submitted.
123. Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome is a clinical syndrome characterized by
certain opportunistic infections and which is at minimum moderately predictive of cellular-
level immune system dysfunction. AIDS: PATHOGENESIS AND TREATMENT 2 (J. Levy ed.
1989). The Centers for Disease Control has established a very detailed case surveillance
definition to guide examining physicians in the diagnosis of AIDS. See infra note 126.
124. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, Pneumocystis pneumonia-Los Angeles, 30
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 250 (1981)[hereinafter MORBIDITY AND
MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT]. The report detailed the unusual pneumonia infections of
five homosexual men. Id. at 250-51. The particular type of pneumonia was quite
uncommon and only found in persons with severely depressed immune systems. Id. at 251.
125. SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT ON ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME 9
(1987). Several viruses have been implicated in the AIDS disease. The viruses suspected of
causing AIDS have been known by several acronyms, including LAV, HTLV-1, HTLV-2 and
HIV. V. DANIELS, AIDS: THE ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME 46 (2nd ed.
1987) [hereinafter V. DANIELS]. The scientific community has agreed upon the designation
of HIV to indicate the causative agent of AIDS. Id. at 47-48. In 1986 the Human Retrovirus
Subcommittee of the International Committee on the Taxonomy of Viruses officially
proposed the designation of HIV for the AIDS viruses. Letters, 232 SCI. 697 (1986).
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clinical or laboratory confirmation of the presence of HIV.12 6 At
least two major tests are used to identify HIV in patients. The
Enzyme-Linked Immuno-Sorbant Assay Test (hereinafter
ELISA)127 is generally used first and will be repeated if a positive
reading is achieved on the first use. 12 If the patient tests positive
for the presence of HIV in a second ELISA test, another test, the
Western blot test, is employed to verify HIV infection.' 29 The
Western blot test is less likely to give false positive results.' 30 Posi-
tive results on all three tests are highly indicative of HIV infection
even if no symptoms appear in the patient.' 3 '
HIV infection manifests itself in a spectrum or continuum
with at least three possible identifiable conditions diagnosable in
an individual. An individual may be infected but asymptomatic,
an individual may be diagnosed as having AIDS Related Complex
(hereinafter ARC) and display certain characteristic symptoms, 3 2
or an individual may be diagnosed as having fully expressed
126. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, Revision of the CDC Surveillance Case
Definition for Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 36 MORBIDrrY AND MORTALITY
WEEKLY REP. 2-3 (Supp. 1-S 1987). The Centers For Disease Control has recently revised
its case definition for AIDS. Id. In grossly simplified terms, the syndrome may be
diagnosed in one of three categories: 1) Without laboratory evidence of the Human
Irmunodeficiency Virus [HIV], in which case other causes of immunodeficiency must be
ruled out and certain indicator diseases must be present; 2) With laboratory evidence for
HIV infection, in which case certain indicator diseases must be present; 3) With laboratory
evidence against HIV infection (i.e., when an HIV test is negative), in which case all other
causes of immunodeficiency must be ruled out and the individual must have either
Pneumocystis pneumonia or certain other indicator diseases and a T-helper/inducer
lymphocyte count of less than 400 per cubic milliliter. Id.
127. V. DANIELS, supra note 125, at 64. All current AIDS tests, including the ELISA
test, do not show the presence of HIV itself. Id. The tests instead show the presence of
antibodies produced by the response of the body to HIV infection. Id. Antibodies are
produced to combat specific diseases and the presence of anti-AIDS antibodies indicates
infection by HIV. Id.
128. V. DANIELS, supra note 125, at 64. HIV infection is indicated if the blood sample
exhibits seropositivity. Seropositivity is shown when the human serum becomes bound to
the AIDS virus on the plastic test sheet. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. AIDS AND THE LAW 212 (W. Dornette ed. 1987 & Supp. 1989). A researcher at
the National Cancer Institute has estimated that two positive ELISA tests followed by a
positive Western blot test will indicate HIV in "999 out of 1,000 cases". Id.
132. AIDS: PATHOGENESIS AND TREATMENT 325 (J. Levy ed. 1989). AIDS Related
Complex is characterized by at least four separate symptoms including, among others, a
weight loss of more than 10% of body weight, prolonged fever, diarrhea for more than
three months, fatigue, anemia, abnormal skin tests, generalized lymph node enlargement.
Id. Many researchers, because of the nearly unbroken continuum of progression
characteristic of the disease from initial infection to fully expressed AIDS, disapprove of the
separate category of ARC. Id. The Centers for Disease Control has revised its classification
system for HIV infection and no longer specifically recognizes a separate category of ARC.
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, Classification System for Human T-Lymphotropic Virus
Type III/Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus Infections. 35 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY
WEEKLY REP. 334-39 (1986). The Centers for Disease Control recognizes three distinct
classification of HIV infection. See infra note 133.
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Since its discovery in 1981, AIDS has spread rapidly. A total of
337 persons were diagnosed with AIDS in 1981.134 As of Decem-
ber 1982 the total number of AIDS cases stood at 878.35 By 1988
the Centers for Disease Control reported that 56,212 persons had
AIDS and between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000 persons were infected
by HIV.136 In 1989 alone, 35,238 new AIDS cases were reported
to the Centers for Disease Control.
137
The increased rate of infection by HIV and the growing death
rate resulting from AIDS has already affected and undoubtedly
will in the future affect the life insurance industry. Applications
for individual life insurance now include a question regarding the
133. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, Classification System for Human T-
Lymphotropic Virus Type III/Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus Infections, 35
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 334-39 (1986). The Centers for Disease
Control now categorizes the groups of HIV infection as Groups I, II and III. Id. Group I is
for those individuals with an acute infection, i.e., fully expressed AIDS. Id. Group II
consists of those individuals with asymptomatic infections. Id. Group III includes other
individuals with persistent generalized lymphadenopathy, i.e., lymph node enlargement.
Id. Generalized lymph node enlargement is one of the most common characteristics of
ARC. See supra note 132.
134. V. DANIELS, supra note 125, at 3.
135. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome - United States, 35 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 757 (1983). By
December of 1983 the total was over 2,900. Id. at 759. One year later the total was 7025.
This figure had doubled by October of 1985 to 14,049. By December of 1986, the Centers
for Disease Control had again doubled the estimate, this time to 28,098. Id.
136. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, Quarterly Report to the Domestic Policy
Council on the Prevalence and Rate of Spread of HIV and AIDS in the United States, 37
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 223-224 (1988). Such a large estimate of HIV
infection may indicate a mushrooming AIDS burden for the health and life insurance
industries. One estimate indicates that as many as 36 percent of all persons infected with
HIV will develop AIDS within 88 months of infection. AIDS: PATHOGENESIS AND
TREATMENT 9 (J. Levy ed. 1989). AIDS remains an incurable and invariably fatal disease.
Id.
137. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome - United States, 1989, 39 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 81 (1990).
In 1989 the incidence rate of AIDS was 14 cases per 100,000 of population. Id. The
Centers for Disease Control has very recently updated and lowered its estimates of the
incidence of HIV infection. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, Estimates of HIV Prevalence
and Projected AIDS Cases: Summary of a Workshop, October 31-November 1, 1989,
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 110-111 (1990). Researchers attending a
national AIDS workshop in November of 1989 agreed that an accurate estimate of the
current number of persons infected with HIV is about 1,000,000. Id. at 111. However, the
prevalence of HIV infections will be manifested by a continued increase in reported AIDS
cases through at least 1993. Id. at 110, 112. Approximately 52,000 to 57,000 new AIDS
cases will be diagnosed in 1990 alone. Id. at 110. The latest estimates indicate that by 1993
the annual increase of AIDS cases will number between 61,000 and 98,000 individuals. Id.
at 117. By 1993 the annual number of deaths from AIDS is expected to reach between
53,000 and 76,000. Id. North Dakota has had one of the lowest rates of HIV infection and
AIDS incidence in the nation. However, in North Dakota, as is true throughout the rest of
the nation, the rates of HIV infection and AIDS diagnoses continue to rise. Grand Forks
Herald, Jan. 4, 1990, at B2, col. 1. Since April of 1985, 76 persons have been tested as HIV
seropositive in North Dakota, 24 have been diagnosed with AIDS and of these, 17 have
died. Id. Eleven of the AIDS cases were reported in 1989 alone compared with only four
reported cases in 1988. Id.
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diagnosis or treatment of AIDS.' 3 ' An individual with knowledge
that he or she has been infected with HIV may fraudulently mis-
represent the condition of his or her health in an application for
life insurance and thereby obtain insurance that would otherwise
be unavailable. Similarly, a person might fraudulently obtain a
favorable blood test, perhaps by employing an imposter when no
or lax identification procedures are used in administering blood
tests. Because AIDS may take four or more years to develop from
the time of the initial infection to fully expressed AIDS,' 39 any mis-
representations regarding pre-existing diseases, diagnosis of HIV
infection, or treatment of AIDS or ARC may not be discovered or
be discoverable until the period of contestability has passed.' 40
Fraud and misrepresentation as to HIV infection or exposure
in an application of life insurance may pose serious problems for
insurers who issue group policies as very few group life insurance
plans require a physical examination or blood test before accept-
ance for applicants who are members of the group to be
insured.14 1 For example, most group life insurance plans do not
require a physical exam for applicants employed full time by the
policy holder. The lack of individual underwriting considerations
is the very essence of group insurance: coverage at lower rates is
138. E.g., Application For Life Insurance, Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance
Company. Northwestern Mutual's application for life insurance states at question 41:
"Have you ever had a medical diagnosis of or have you received medical advice or
treatment for Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) or Aids Related Complex
(ARC) or any disorder of the immune system?" Id. The application also comes with an
authorization form for an HIV (AIDS) Antibody status test which includes a release of the
results to the insurer. Id.
139. AIDS: PATHOGENESIS AND TREATMENT 9 (J. Levy ed. 1989). The incubation
period from infection to fully expressed AIDS can vary based on the means of infection.
Persons infected by blood transfusion have a mean incubation period of about 29 months
while homosexual and bisexual men have a mean incubation period of about 55 months. Id.
140. The nearly universal period of contestability is two years. See the various states'
statutes, supra note 27. If the AIDS takes more than two years to become fully expressed
from the date of first infection, an applicant for life insurance could apply for and receive
coverage under a policy not requiring medical examination, notwithstanding any questions
on the application regarding pre-existing diseases or representations of good health. After
the passage of the two years such misrepresentations in the application would not void the
policy or preclude coverage.
141. AIDS AND THE LAW 206-207 (W. Dornette ed. 1987 & Supp. 1989). An insurer's
intent in underwriting a group insurance plan is to insure a group whose aggregate risks are
reasonably predictable. Id. Most group insurance plans require- a high percentage of
enrollment of the eligible members of the group. Id. Thus, the health of particular
individuals is not an underwriting factor and eligible members of the group are not subject
to examinations or screenings. Id. Generally, the only underwriting factors considered in
group life insurance plans are the size of the group to be insured, the percentage of
participation by eligible members of the group, the kinds of occupations included in the
group and the risks inherent in such occupations, and the source of premium contributions.
Id. Eligibility for enrollment in the group plan is usually judged by the sole criteria of
active, full-time employment at the employers usual place of business. Id. See also,
Simpson v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 24 N.Y.2d 262, 263, 247 N.E.2d 655, 656 (1969).
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available because administration costs are lower and the actuarial
characteristics of the group covered are more favorable.
142
The potential for crisis exists in juncture of the underwriting
characteristics of group insurance, the nature of AIDS and the
operation and effect of the incontestability clause. Discussed
below are some of the ramifications of this juncture.
B. APPLICATION OF INCONTESTABILITY CLAUSES TO THE
AIDS DISEASE
To date, surprisingly few cases have reached appellate courts
on the issues presented in this Note. Of these few, none have dealt
with the conflicting interpretations of the incontestability clause as
delineated in Simpson and Conway.1
43
1. Under the Simpson View
The opinion of the Simpson court demonstrates the concerns
that arise at the intersection of the incontestability clause and the
AIDS epidemic. Under the Simpson analysis, insurers may be
142. D. GREGG, supra note 70, at 18-19. Group insurance enables insurers to
efficiently distribute and administer policies of life insurance to a large number of persons.
Id. The mass selling and enrollment procedures used in group insurance reduce the cost
per person of insuring lives. Id. See also., Freed v. Bankers Life Ins. Co. of Nebraska, 216
N.W.2d 357, 359 (Iowa 1974). In the typical group insurance plan such matters as
determining who will be included in the group to be insured, collecting and paying
insurance premiums, and other such administrative concerns is the responsibility of the
master policy holder. Freed, 216 N.W.2d at 359. For a discussion of the actuarial
characteristics of group insurance, see AIDS AND THE LAW 206-207 (W. Dornette ed. 1987).
See also Simpson v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 24 N.Y.2d 262,247 N.E.2d 655, 299 N.Y.S.
2d 835 (1969). The major distinction between group life and individual life insurance is that
under a group insurance policy a greater number of persons who would not ordinarily
procure insurance are covered because of the typical requirement of employer-paid group
insurance plans that all employees be included in the plan. D. GREGG, supra. The
population which comprises the employees in a group insurance plan generally, as a group,
constitute a better insurance risk, than the same number of persons seeking private policies.
Simpson, 24 N.Y.2d at 268, 247 N.E.2d at 658, 299 N.Y.S. 2d at 840-841.
143. See Fernandez v. Bankers Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 906 F.2d 559 (1lth Cir. 1990) (court
of appeals reversed because of genuine issues of material fact regarding whether
misrepresentations by the insured made in an application for a $250,000.00 life insurance
policy were material and remanded case for further discovery); Zachary Trading Inc. v.
Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 668 F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (insurer which
contested the policy before the expiration of the period of contestability was entitled to
summary judgment due to the materiality of the insured's misrepresentations and failure to
disclose various illnesses in an application for a $500,000.00 key-man life insurance); Roper
Group, Inc. v. Home Indemnity Co., No. 88-9752 (E.D. Pa. July 25, 1990) (WL 106724)
(court held that beneficiary of a $54,812.70 credit life insurance policy was entitled to the
policy benefit as the insurer failed to prove that the insured had an actual intent to deceive
when making general representations of good health and failing to disclose various illnesses
when the application contained no questions regarding AIDS and did not require a physical
examination); Allstate Ins. Co. v. City of Billings, 780 P.2d 186 (Mont. 1989) (the insurer
sued for production of insured's police records for evidence of the insured's use of illegal
drugs, treatment for AIDS, or the presence of mental or physical disorders because of
possible misrepresentations by the insured in an application for a $130,000 life insurance
policy).
unable to successfully exclude coverage for death caused by AIDS
as the incontestability clause would be interpreted to preclude the
raising of any defense not excepted in the policy. 44 The Simpson
court held that any risks which are ascertainable or discoverable
by the insurer at the time the policy of insurance was issued are
conditions of insurance and are properly excluded as defenses by
the operation of the incontestability clause.'
45
The problem with the Simpson analysis arises in the context of
the AIDS epidemic when insurers seek to exclude death by certain
causes, such as AIDS. If discoverability is the "hallmark of the dis-
tinction between conditions and limitations," then attempts at
excluding certain diseases from coverage will be unsuccessful
unless the disease was not discoverable at the time of the issuance
of the policy. Any disease which is excluded from coverage but
which was discoverable at the time of the application, will be sub-
ject to coverage under the policy, notwithstanding the exclusion.
Only when an HIV infection is not discoverable will an insurer be
able to exclude coverage for the disease. Insurers will thus be
required to test every applicant for infection by HIV regardless of
the nature of the insurance policy or the dollar value of benefits.'
46
However, a number of states have begun to limit insurers' ability
to require blood tests for the presence of HIV in applicants for
group life insurance. 147 If such limitations on HIV blood tests are
adopted in other states, insurers may find themselves unable to
exercise the very act of discovery required by the Simpson analy-
sis. In states which follow the Simpson analysis but which still per-
mit HIV blood testing, insurers will still be put to much greater
expense in investigating possible HIV infection. In states follow-
ing Simpson, if an applicant's infection escapes detection, life
insurance is issued, and a claim for benefits is made upon death
after the passage of two years. Under a policy which excludes
death by AIDS, the insurer will be precluded from raising the
exclusion as a defense. Under the Simpson analysis, the disease
was discoverable and as a condition of insurance, properly pre-
144. See, e.g., Simpson v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Company, 24 N.Y.2d 269, 266,
247 N.E.2d 655, 659, 299 N.Y.S. 2d 835, 841 (1969). The Simpson court noted that the
problem of adverse risk selection is not unique to group policies. Id. Insurers of individual
policies had long faced the same problem and resolved it by requiring physical
examinations and by investigating medical histories. Id.
145. Id.
146. Requiring medical examinations or blood tests for all applicants would necessarily
increase the cost of group insurance and blur the distinction between group and individual
life insurance.
147. See infra notes 153-155 and accompanying text.
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cluded from assertion by the insurer as a defense by the operation
of the incontestability clause.
2. Under the Crawford View
The Crawford court's analysis, as applied to the problem of
group life insurance, AIDS, and the incontestability clause, yields a
more sensible solution. The Crawford court limited the scope of
the incontestability clause to those defenses which are challenges
of the validity of the policy.148 Under the Crawford analysis, eligi-
bility for group coverage was not related to the validity of the pol-
icy but only to the risk assumed. 49 Risks assumed are those risks
which the insurer is willing to cover in the policy. Risks excluded
are those of such uncertainty or of such great risk as to be properly
limited by the policy to make affordable coverage available to all
insureds. Thus, under the Crawford analysis, an insurer may
exclude those causes of death which are of such an inordinate risk
as to radically alter the life expectancies of the group to be
covered.
If an insured dies from a cause of death excluded by the pol-
icy, the incontestability clause would not work. to bring the cause
of death within the scope of coverage of the policy. This result
would be more logical and would result in the interpretation of life
insurance policies more in accord with the plain meaning of the
language used by the parties to the contract of insurance. An
exclusion from coverage for a specified disease would operate pre-
cisely as the parties envisioned. If insurers should wish to include
coverage for AIDS they could do so at a commensurately higher
premium. Likewise, if state legislatures wish to require AIDS cov-
erage or to prohibit specified disease exclusions in life insurance
policies, they would be free to do so. However, the judicial inclu-
sion of coverage for a cause of death which an insurer has expressly
attempted to exclude is contrary to the intent of the parties to the
insurance contract and contrary to the accepted interpretation of
the incontestability clause.
C. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO AIDS AND THE INSURANCE
INDUSTRY
In addition to the possible constraints placed on insurers by
the application of the incontestability clause to insureds with
148. See Crawford v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of U.S., 56 I11. 2d 41, 50, 305 N.E.2d




AIDS, other issues regarding AIDS and life insurers have arisen.' 50
A number of states have recently passed legislation which regu-
lates the insurance industry's response to AIDS.'5 1 These regula-
tions fall into several identifiable categories of requirements or
prohibitions affecting insurers. The legislation includes statutes
which prohibit any inquiry into the sexual orientation of insurance
applicants or the use of the knowledge of an applicant's sexual ori-
entation for underwriting purposes;152 statutes which require
informed consent before HIV blood tests are administered;l5 3 stat-
utes which prohibit the use or consideration by insurers of HIV
tests taken prior to an application for insurance;15 4 statutes which
limit or prohibit insurers from ordering mandatory HIV blood
tests;' 5 5 and statutes which prohibit insurers from writing exclu-
150. See generally, McMartin, AIDS (HIV) and Insurance Discrimination Against
HIV-Infected Individuals (1990) (Westlaw, Text and PeriodicalsXfound exclusively on
Westlaw).
151. See generally, AIDS AND THE LAw (W. Dornette ed. 1987 & Supp. 1989).
152. Id. at 72. Some of the regulations and statutes relating to AIDS and the insurance
industry have been patterned after model guidelines drafted in 1986 by the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners [hereinafter NAIC]. Id. These guidelines were
drafted to prevent the use of the sexual orientation of an applicant or insured in insurance
underwriting or in determining insurability. Id. The guidelines prohibit the inclusion of
any questions in insurance applications which establish the sexual orientation of an
applicant. Id. By 1988 ten states had adopted the model guidelines of the NAIC. These
states are Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Oregon, South Dakota,
Texas, and Wisconsin. Id.
153. AIDS AND THE LAW 110-116 (W. Dornette ed. 1987 & Supp. 1989). To date, at
least 21 states have enacted informed consent statutes with respect to AIDS testing. Id.
Some of the statutes simply require that no person may conduct an HIV test without the
written, informed consent of the person to be tested. Id. Other states have enacted much
more comprehensive provisions regarding informed consent which require certain
specified disclosures to the person to be tested before the consent will be regarded as
informed. Id.
154. Id. Statutes which prevent an insurer from considering HIV tests administered
prior to an application for insurance have been enacted to prevent insurers from unfairly
discriminating against applicants. Id. Legislatures have been motivated to pass these
restrictions because of a concern that insurers might assume that persons tested for HIV
were tested because of membership in an at-risk category. Id. With the restriction,
insurers might use the knowledge of prior HIV tests of applicants to deny coverage, exclude
coverage for specified diseases such. as AIDS or charge higher premiums. Id. The purpose
of these regulations is much the same as the NAIC guidelines prohibiting the use of sexual
orientation. Both limitations work to curtail an insurers' ability to inquire into the lifestyle
and sexual orientation of applicants and to preclude the use of sexual orientation as a risk
classification. Id.
155. Id. Among the jurisdictions which have enacted legislation limiting the right of
insurers to order HIV blood tests are California, District of Columbia, Florida, and
Wisconsin. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE & 199.21(f) (1985) (prohibits insurers from
using the results of HIV blood tests to determine insurability); D.C. CODE ANN. § 35-223
(1988) (insurers may not deny, cancel, or refuse to renew insurance coverage, or alter
benefits covered because an individual has tested positive for HIV or has refused such a test,
repealed by 1989 D.C. Stat. 7-208); D.C. CODE ANN. § 35-224 (1988) (prohibits the use of
blood tests to detect the HIV in the determination of insurability, rewritten by 1989 D.C.
Stat. 7-208. § 35-224 (1989 Supp.)) (presently permits blood tests and the use of such tests in
determining insurability); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.429 (Supp. West 1989) (insurers prohibited
from: excluding eligible individuals from group insurance coverage because of a positive
HIV test or any specific sickness or medical condition resulting from HIV exposure;
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sions or limitations of benefits for death related to AIDS, ARC, or
HIV infection.
1 56
While these statutes generally do not directly affect the opera-
tion of the incontestability clause, they may have an effect on the
ability of insurers to limit or exclude the coverage of life insurance
policies in the event of death caused by AIDS, HIV infection, or
one of the opportunistic diseases associated with AIDS.1 - 7 Insurers
which are unable to exclude coverage for AIDS may have to rely
on pre-existing condition clauses158 in life insurance policies to
excluding coverage either as a condition precedent or subsequent to the issuance, but
permitting such exclusions if coverage by individual underwriting is otherwise allowed by
law); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 631.90 (West 1980 & Supp. 1989) (insurers prohibited from
requiring applicants to reveal whether HIV tests have been taken, conditioning coverage
on whether a test has been taken, and considering whether an applicant has been tested in
establishing premium rates). As to AIDS testing, see generally, Campbell, Mandatory AIDS
Testing and Privacy: A Psycholegal Perspective, 66 N.D. L. REV. - (1990).
156. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.429 (5Xa) (West 1989 Supp.) The protections of the
statute are somewhat ambivalent. The Florida statute states that providers of group
insurance may not deny eligibility for coverage to an otherwise eligible individual on the
basis of exposure to HIV or medical conditions related to AIDS. Id. However, the
guarantee of eligibility is somewhat limited as this section states that the limitation on
insurers does not control if individual underwriting is otherwise allowed by law. Id.
Similarly, the statute prohibits discriminatory actions of insurers by providing that, except
for preexisting condition clauses specifically applying to a sickness or medical condition of
the insured, benefits under a life insurance policy may not be denied or limited due to the
fact that the insured's death was caused, either directly or indirectly, by exposure to the
HIV virus or a specific medical condition associated with the virus. Id. The statute,
however, does permit the issuance of "accidental death only" or "specified disease" policies.
Id. Thus, insurers in Florida will be permitted to write life insurance policies excepting out
from coverage death from exposure to HIV or death resulting from AIDS.
157. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.429 (5) (Supp. West 1989) (insurers of group
policies may not exclude coverage of eligible individuals due to a positive HIV test or
exposure to AIDS unless individual underwriting is otherwise permitted by law;
additionally, insurers may not limit or exclude death benefits because of death caused by
exposure to HIV or a disease associated with HIV infection unless the exclusion pertains to a
pre-existing disease of the insured); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2159(4) (West Supp.
1990) (group life insurance policies may contain exclusions for death caused by AIDS, ARC
or HIV related diseases but only for such diseases which existed six months prior to the
effective date of insurance and if an actuarial justification is filed and approved by the
superintendent of insurance; such exclusion may not be effective longer than the period of
the incontestability clause); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2526-A (West Supp. 1990) (no
individual policy of life insurance may contain more restrictive coverage for death resulting
from AIDS, ARC or HIV related diseases than for death from other diseases nor exclude
coverage for death resulting from AIDS, ARC or HIV related diseases); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2629 (West Supp. 1990) (no group life insurance policy may contain more
restrictive coverage for death resulting from AIDS, ARC or HIV related diseases than for
death from other diseases nor exclude coverage for death resulting from AIDS, ARC or HIV
related diseases except for the exclusions for diseases present six months before the
effective date of insurance as provided in § 2159 (4)); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A,
§ 4120(2) (West Supp. 1990) (fraternal benefit societies may not offer life benefit certificates
which contain more restrictive coverage or which exclude benefits for death resulting from
AIDS, ARC or HIV related diseases); TEx. INS. CODE ANN. § 350-3(4A) (Vernon Supp. 1990)
(the administrative council of Texas State Colleges and Universities may not contract for
group health insurance which contains a provision excluding or limiting coverage for
AIDS); TEx. INS. CODE ANN. § 351-5A (Vernon Supp. 1990) (local governments may not
contract for group health insurance which contains a provision excluding or limiting
coverage for AIDS).
158. Pre-existing condition or disease clauses are common in accident, health and
limit their liability for payment of AIDS related deaths. However,
in states following Simpson, insurers may be barred from raising
the defense of a failure of a condition precedent to coverage after
the passage of two years from the issuance of the policy. 159 Thus,
even if an insurer excluded life insurance coverage for death
caused by a pre-existing infection with HIV, failure to discover the
infection and challenge the validity of coverage of the policy
within the two years of the incontestability clause will likely pre-
clude the later assertion of the defenses.
To date, only one statute addresses AIDS and the life insur-
ance incontestability clause. The District of Columbia Code Anno-
tated, section 35-227 provides that insurers may contest the
validity of a life insurance policy within three years of the issuance
of the policy, if the challenge is based on a defense of a knowing
failure of the insured to disclose to the insurer that the applicant
had AIDS.' 60 The statute provides a special extension of the
period of contestability in life insurance policies from two years to
three years when the insurer contests a policy based on a misrep-
resentation by the applicant regarding AIDS.
61
As the AIDS epidemic continues to spread, more states will
likely enact legislation restricting the ability of insurers to treat
persons with AIDS or at risk for AIDS differently from other appli-
cants for life insurance. Thus, insurers will have to consider the
interaction of various other statutes with the incontestability
clause when writing life insurance policies.
III. CONCLUSION
Nearly all states with a requirement of an incontestability
clause hold that fraud by the insured at the inception of the policy
of life insurance ceases to be a defense to the insurer after the run-
ning of the two year period of contestability.162 More than fifteen
disability insurance policies and operate to exclude coverage for any condition or disease
which the applicant possesses prior to the beginning of coverage. Presumably, absent a
statutory prohibition, an insurer could attempt to exclude from coverage a death caused by
specified pre-existing diseases such as AIDS.
159. See, e.g., Simpson v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 24 N.Y.2d 262, 247 N.E.2d 655,
299 N.Y.S. 2d 835 (1969). The Simpson court held that defenses which are conditions of
insurance are barred by the incontestability clause as these are discoverable by the insurer
before coverage begins, Id. at 267, 247 N.E.2d at 657, 299 N.Y.S. 2d at 839. If an insurer
fails to discover the HIV infection prior to the passage of the two years of the
incontestability clause, any condition precedent to insurance predicated on HIV infection
will fail.
160. D.C. CODE ANN. § 35-227 (Supp. 1989).
161. See id.
162. Button v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 584, 587-88 (9th Cir. 1988).
The Button court stated that other courts have uniformly interpreted incontestability
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states' courts have held that the incontestability clause precludes
the raising of virtually all defenses of the insurer after the running
of the two year period.163 In these states, even the failure of a
condition precedent to the beginning of coverage or the occur-
rence of a condition terminating coverage will cease to be
defenses for an insurer who wishes to avoid a contract of
insurance.
As applied to AIDS, such an interpretation of the incontest-
ability clause may force insurers to accept a risk they were other-
wise unwilling to assume if they had excluded AIDS from
coverage. Without changes in the law of insurance regarding
incontestability and HIV testing, in those states following Simpson,
insurance rates may rise to unreasonable levels for everyone or
insurers may elect to withdraw from the market.
Conversely, without protection, persons who are HIV sero-
positive, suspected to have AIDS, or belonging to an at-risk group
may have great difficulty in obtaining life insurance. The District
of Columbia statutes take some measures to protect against such
problems.
164
The urgency of the AIDS epidemic certainly calls for action
on many fronts. The present situation concerning AIDS and life
insurance calls for the enactment of uniform laws which offer
clauses to bar insurers, after the expiration of the period of contestability, from declaring
policies void on the basis of misrepresentations in the application. Id. See also Crawford v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of U.S., 56 Ill.2d 41, 305 N.E.2d 144 (1973). The Crawford
court noted that one effect of an incontestability clause is to permit recovery by a
beneficiary in cases of fraudulent misrepresentations in an application for insurance. Id. at
47, 305 N.E.2d at 148. Payment of benefits is mandated on the basis that the
misrepresentations were not discovered prior to the expiration of the period of
contestability. Id. Balanced against this undesirable result of rewarding fraud, however, is
the public policy consideration of assuring a beneficiary that a claim could not be
challenged at some remote time after the insured's death and when others who might have
testified in the beneficiary's behalf might also be unable to testify. Id.
163. See National Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Blankenbiller, 89 Ariz. 253, 360 P.2d 1030
(1961); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Dorman, 108 F.2d 220 (9th cir. 1940) (applying
California law); Suskind v. American Republic Ins. Co., 458 F. Supp. 680 (1978) rev'd on
other grounds, 607 F.2d 76 (3rd Cir. 1979) (applying Delaware law); Equitable Life Assur.
Soc. v. Florence, 171 S.E. 317 (Ga. Ct. App. 1933); Maxwell v. Cumberland Life Ins. Co., 748
P.2d 392 (Idaho 1987); Powell v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 313 Ill. 161, 144 N.E.
825 (1924); Freed v. Bankers Life Ins. Co. of Nebraska, 216 N.W.2d 357 (Iowa 1974); Jackson
v. Continental Cas. Co., 412 So.2d 1364 (La. 1982); Bonitz v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 374 Mass.
327, 372 N.E.2d 254 (1978); Stratton v. Service Life Ins. Co., 117 Neb. 685, 222 N.W. 332
(1928); Foster v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 118 N.J. Law 228, 192 A. 59 (N.J. 1937); Simpson
v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 24 N.Y.2d 262, 247 N.E.2d 655 (1969); Chavis v. Southern
Life Ins. Co., 318 N.C. 259, 347 S.E. 425 (1986); Jordon v. Western States Life Ins. Co., 78
N.D. 902, 53 N.W.2d 860 (1952); Baum v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 357 P.2d 641
(Okla. 1960); Feierman v. Eureka Life Ins. Co., 279 Pa. 507, 124 A.2d 171 (1924); Cragun v.
Banker's Life Company, 28 Utah 2d 19, 497 P.2d 641 (1972); Millis v. Continental Life Ins.
Co., 162 Wash. 555, 298 P.739.
164. See the excerpts from and discussion of the statutes at notes 140-141 and 144-145.
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some measure of sensible protection for both insurers and insureds
in the acquisition of life insurance. An approach should be taken
to insure that life insurance will continue to be available to most
persons and that life insurance premiums will not skyrocket.
Eric K. Fosaaen

